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Harlan Grant Cohen* 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the discovery of oxygen, scientists’ best explanation of fire was 
that it was caused by “phlogistons,” a mysterious fire-like substance found in 
flammable materials, released during combustion, and reabsorbed by plants. As 
Thomas Kuhn recounts in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,1 a field of 
phlogiston studies emerged, with scientists across Europe experimenting on, 
theorizing, and debating the substance and its attributes. This continued even as 
experiments raised doubts about the theory or challenged its core assumptions.  
Eventually, Antoine-Laurent de Lavoisier discovered oxygen, turning the as-
sumptions of phlogiston theory on its head. But even as news of the discovery 
spread, and even though oxygen solved many of the problems raised by the in-
creasingly complex theories of phlogistons, scientists had trouble changing 
their views and their focus. Perhaps oxygen was a phlogiston? Or maybe oxy-
gen worked with phlogistons in creating fire? Rather than simplifying their the-
ories, the new discovery made many of them more complex. As Kuhn explains, 
it took a generation before oxygen and its study became the new scientific par-
adigm around which scientists and their assumptions, theories, and experiments 
revolved. 2 
After two decades of seeming calm following the 1994 creation of the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”), international trade law in 2019 is in flux. 
At the surface level, states are actively rethinking and renegotiating the terms 
of trade between them. In Europe, the United Kingdom is involved in protract-
ed negotiations to leave the European Union after a popular referendum sup-
ported “Brexit.”3 At the heart of those efforts is a belief that the United King-
dom should be able to negotiate its own trade deals with the rest of the world 
rather than as part of the European bloc.4 In the United States, the Trump ad-
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 1. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 53 (1962). 
 2.  Id. at 152. 
 3. Anushka Asthana, Ben Quinn & Rowena Mason, UK Votes to Leave EU after Dramatic Night Di-
vides Nation, THE GUARDIAN (June 24, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/britain-votes-
for-brexit-eu-referendum-david-cameron. 
 4.  Bruce Stokes, Brexit Vote Highlighted UK’s Discontent with EU, but other European Countries are 
Grumbling too, PEW RES. CTR. (June 24, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/24/brexit-vote-
highlighted-uks-discontent-with-eu-but-other-european-countries-are-grumbling-too; Brexitland Versus Lon-
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ministration has decried the trade deals negotiated by its predecessors, accusing 
prior administrations of rolling over as other states took advantage of the Unit-
ed States and stole U.S. jobs.5 With rhetoric shifting regularly between the 
combative and the conciliatory, the administration has withdrawn the United 
States’ signature from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”)6 and renegotiated 
the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (“KORUS”)7 and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).8 It has attacked the WTO and 
threatened its dispute settlement system by vetoing all appointments to its Ap-
pellate Body.9 As a result, by December 2019, the Appellate Body will have 
fewer than the three members required to hear appeals and effectively cease to 
function.10 These attacks persist, even as the United States continues to bring 
disputes to the WTO over China’s trade practices.11 
Meanwhile, the United States has issued tariffs on steel and aluminum 
from countries in Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia, and Oceania, 
and an even broader array of tariffs on Chinese products.12 Perhaps most con-
troversially, the United States has invoked the security exception, Article XXI, 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) to justify the former 
tariffs and to potentially insulate them from WTO review.13 It has threatened to 
do the same regarding tariffs on automobiles.14 And in breaking this taboo 
against using Article XXI, it has joined others like the United Arab Emirates in 
 
donia, ECONOMIST (June 30, 2016), https://www.economist.com/britain/2016/06/30/brexitland-versus-
londonia. 
 5. Nina Lakhani, Trump’s Nafta Threats would Severely Harm US, Mexican Chief Negotiator Says, 
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/15/nafta-donald-trump-
mexico-economy (“The property mogul vowed throughout his campaign to redraft or withdraw from Nafta 
which he described as the ‘worst deal ever’. . .”). 
 6. Adam Davidson, What the Death of the T.P.P. Means for America, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 23, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/business/adam-davidson/what-the-death-of-the-t-p-p-means-for-america.   
 7. Jim Tankersley, Trump Signs Revised Korean Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/us/politics/south-korea-trump-trade-deal.html. 
 8.  Jim Tankersley, Trump Just Ripped Up Nafta. Here’s What’s in the New Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/business/trump-nafta-usmca-differences.html. 
 9. See Rachel Brewster, The Trump Administration and the Future of the WTO, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. 
ONLINE 3 (2018). 
 10.  Tom Miles, U.S. Blocks WTO Judge Reappointment as Dispute Settlement Crisis Looms, REUTERS 
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-wto/u-s-blocks-wto-judge-reappointment-as-
dispute-settlement-crisis-looms-idUSKCN1LC19O. 
 11. Tom Miles, China and U.S. Accuse each other of Hypocrisy as WTO Litigation Begins, REUTERS 
(Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-wto-tariffs/china-and-u-s-accuse-each-other-of-
hypocrisy-as-wto-litigation-begins-idUSKCN1NQ1KU. 
 12. Ana Swanson, White House to Impose Metal Tariffs on E.U., Canada and Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (May 
31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/us/politics/trump-aluminum-steel-tariffs.html; China and Eu-
rope join WTO Challenge to Trump Metals Tariffs, Opening New Front in Trade War, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2169238/china-and-europe-join-
wto-challenge-trump-metals-tariffs. 
 13. See J. Benton Heath, The New National Security Challenge to the Economic Order, 129 YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2020). 
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blurring the lines between trade and security.15 Observing the trend, Anthea 
Roberts, Henrique Choer Moraes, and Victor Ferguson have declared a new era 
of Geoeconomics.16 For their part, other states have brought their complaints to 
the WTO against the United States, but rather than wait for their disputes to be 
resolved, many have issued their own tariffs against U.S. productions in retalia-
tion.17 
In the midst of these Anglo-American attacks on the status quo, initiatives 
like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”) and the Trade 
in Services Agreement (“TiSA”) seem to have been abandoned.  The other 
states involved in the TPP negotiations, however, have decided to move for-
ward without the United States to create the re-dubbed Comprehensive and 
Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”),18 and negotiations for free 
trade agreements among others continues apace.19 China and India, previously 
cast as the upstarts blocking progress through the WTO, have now found them-
selves starring as cheerleaders for the system.20  
But the flux runs much deeper than this sudden jockeying for position. At 
the heart of these moves lies a broader, popular anxiety over the trading system 
and its benefits, evidenced in the electoral victories for Donald Trump and his 
anti-trade rhetoric in the United States and the Brexit movement in the United 
Kingdom.21 In both countries, many feel left behind by economic globalization. 
Trade may be benefitting some in their countries, but not them. And it is not 
only voters in the United States and United Kingdom that feel that way. 
Much like phlogiston scientists working at the time of oxygen’s discov-
ery, trade lawyers are in the uncomfortable position of seeing their experiments 
fail, but without fully understanding why. For those committed to the belief that 
trade liberalization and deeper integration are the best paths to common 
 
 15. Marc L. Busch, Trump Claims that a National Security Exception Allows Him to Block Imports. Is 
He Right?, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2019/01/11/trump-claims-that-a-national-security-exception-allows-him-to-block-imports-is-he-
right/?utm_term=.88744f3a9feb. 
 16.  Anthea Roberts, Henrique Choer Moraes, & Victor Ferguson, Geoeconomics: the U.S. Strategy of 
Technological Protection and Economic Security, LAWFARE (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/geoeconomics-us-strategy-technological-protection-and-economic-security. 
 17.  See, e.g., José-Miguel y Villarino, Trade Retaliation in the Time of Trump, EJIL: TALK! (Aug. 3, 
2018) https://www.ejiltalk.org/trade-retaliation-in-the-time-of-trump/; Joseph Weiler, Black Lies, White Lies 
and Some Uncomfortable Truths in and of the International Trading System, EJIL: TALK! (July 25, 2018), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/black-lies-white-lies-and-some-uncomfortable-truths-in-and-of-the-international-
trading-system/; Henry Gao, How Can China Respond to the Trump Tariffs in a WTO-Consistent Manner?, 
INT’L L. & ECON. POL’Y BLOG (April 7, 2018), https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/04/how-can-
china-respond-to-the-trump-tariffs-in-a-wto-consistent-manner.html. 
 18.  CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, From TPP to CPTPP (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/tpp-cptpp. 
 19.  Sarah Porter, A Whole New World for Free Trade, BBC (Dec. 28, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46601315 (for an overview of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership 
Agreement). 
 20.  See Rachel Brewster, Monkey Cage: Trump is breaking the WTO. Will China Want to Save it?, 
WASH. POST (May 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/02/trump-is-
breaking-the-wto-will-china-want-to-save-it/?utm_term=.04c861af032b&noredirect=on. 
 21.  Harlan Grant Cohen, What is International Trade Law for?, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 326, 326 (2019). 
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prosperity and to the normal science of trade negotiations, the current problems 
reflect either flaws in the specific agreements negotiated (perhaps they are not 
liberal enough) or failures by other actors, specifically domestic policymakers, 
to do their part to redistribute the gains of trade so that all might benefit.22 Like 
the mass protests at the 1999 Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference or the failure 
of the Doha round of trade negotiations, the current issues reveal where policies 
need to be tweaked to better serve the system’s goals; they are not threats to the 
broader direction or logic of trade law. For others, the current trade flux is a 
wake-up call, a reflection that something is wrong with the inherited wisdom. 
Together with prior warnings, the current crises suggest a more fundamental 
rethinking of trade law is in order. But while there is a general sense that some-
thing is wrong with the pre-2016 consensus, figuring out what might replace it 
remains elusive. 
Gregory Shaffer is at the forefront of international trade lawyers searching 
for the oxygen that might sustain a new vision of trade law. Retooling Interna-
tional Trade for Social Inclusion23 is a noble and sensitive effort to take the 
complaints of trade’s discontents seriously, to ask hard questions about why the 
system is facing so many challenges, and to suggest concrete policies to reform 
international trade. In doing so, he picks up the baton from economists like Da-
ni Rodrik24  and leads the way for a group of like-minded legal scholars includ-
ing Timothy Meyer,25  Frank Garcia,26 Nicolas Lamp,27  and myself,28 among 
others. 
The lingering, anxiety-inducing question, however, is whether trade law is 
capable of solving the problems with the trade regime. Any effective reform, 
this essay suggests, must (a) start with a new normative narrative, fueling a new 
political conversation about trade’s purpose, and (b) resituate trade within a 
broader set of normative concerns about both the international and domestic 
orders, from the human rights regime to international financial regulation, from 
regulation of the data economy, artificial intelligence, and the future of work to 
climate change. Trade lawyers may lack the vision to accomplish those goals. 
Like the phlogiston scientists of old, our expertise may act as blinders. And 
 
 22. Id. at 12. 
 23.  See Gregory Shaffer, Retooling Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 
(2019). 
 24.  See DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD 
ECONOMY (2011); DANI RODRIK, STRAIGHT TALK ON TRADE: IDEAS FOR A SANE WORLD ECONOMY (2017). See 
also Gregory Shaffer, How Do We Get Along? International Economic Law And The Nation-State, 117 MICH. 
L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2019). 
 25.  Timothy Meyer, Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade, 70 VAND. L. REV. 985, 
1014–20 (2017) (proposing that free trade agreements include an “Economic Development Obligations” chap-
ter to soften the domestic loses from trade liberalization). 
 26.  Frank J. Garcia & Timothy Meyer, Restoring Trade’s Social Contract, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 
78, 93–100 (2018). 
 27.  Nicolas Lamp, How Should We Think about the Winners and Losers from Globalization? Three Nar-
ratives and Their Implications for the Redesign of International Economic Agreements, (Nov. 26, 2018), avail-
able at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3290590.   
 28.  Cohen, supra note 21. 
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while efforts like Shaffer’s to diagnose the problems and suggest reforms may 
be necessary, we may need help from outside to find a truly new way of think-
ing about trade. 
Two-Step Leap of Faith 
At the center-point of Shaffer’s analysis is a diagnosis that the two-step 
model of trade and social welfare has failed.29 Orthodox trade policy has been 
built around a normative narrative that liberalized international trade, through 
the power of comparative advantage, grows the economic pie for all states.30 
All states, says the orthodoxy, are better off after international trade than they 
would be without it. 
What liberalizing trade cannot do on its own, though, is guarantee the fair 
distribution of international trade’s benefits within states. Inevitably, some in-
dustries will profit off of new markets abroad, while other will suffer from 
cheaper competition. Some workers will lose their jobs while others will thrive, 
in part because cheaper products give them greater purchasing power. 
This is where the two steps come in. International trade agreements could 
be arranged to deal with some of these distributional concerns, allowing states 
to protect or subsidize particular industries. This, though, according to trade or-
thodoxy, would be both economically and normatively sub-optimal. From an 
economic standpoint, growing the overall pie through liberalized trade is sim-
pler, more efficient, and more manageable than trying to engineer fair interna-
tional distribution. Moreover, while such engineering would be nearly impossi-
ble to get right, it would be guaranteed to shrink the overall welfare benefits 
states receive. From a normative standpoint, questions of redistribution involve 
tradeoffs between different groups and interests that are most legitimately made 
through democratic politics. Along with questions about what a “fair” distribu-
tion might be, redistribution could be achieved through different forms of taxa-
tion or through the provision of any number of benefits from direct payments to 
health care, education, infrastructure spending, etc. In the absence of a global 
demos,31 that sort of politics can only take place within states, the only sites of 
sufficient social solidarity to legitimate such tradeoffs.32 Recognizing these two 
points, current trade law and policy orthodoxy adopts a two-step approach to 
social and material justice. In step one, international trade law will work to-
wards the freest and most efficient allocation of resources to grow the overall 
pie and make all states better off. In step two, these benefits of freer trade will 
be distributed within states through domestic taxation and social welfare poli-
cies. 
 
 29. Shaffer, supra note 23, at 4. (“The two-step model has become a harmful ideology because it elides 
the need to make sustainable development the organizing principle for international cooperation, as reflected in 
the United Nations sustainable development goals.”). 
 30.  For more on this normative narrative, see Cohen, supra note 21.  
 31.  See generally Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge 
for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596 (1999). 
 32.  See Shaffer, supra note 23. 
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The problem with this two-step model, as Shaffer details, is that while 
trade lawyers have been running apace to achieve step one, domestic policy-
makers have dropped the baton on step two. As trade agreements have deep-
ened across the trans-Atlantic world, the welfare state has been rolled back, 
taxation systems have become less progressive, and income gaps between rich 
and poor have widened dramatically.33 Most importantly, this reality demon-
strates an inherent flaw in the two-step model. Not only is there no guarantee 
that step one will be followed by step two, but the success of step one increases 
the economic and political power of capital relative to labor and other interests, 
granting it outsized authority over the shape and pace of step two. Increasingly 
mobile in a world of low trade barriers, private companies can now negotiate 
the terms of their location in particular states, including their tax and regulatory 
burdens. 
This realization leads Shaffer to suggest a variety of reforms that might 
re-engage and re-empower those other stakeholders. 34 These reforms include 
tying negotiations of trade liberalization to fairer allocations of taxes among 
states,35 strengthening the social safety net,36 introducing mechanisms that la-
bor and other groups can use to protect domestic social welfare policies from 
being undermined by less-regulated foreign competition,37 and granting states 
greater space to experiment with industrial policy.38 In my own work, I have 
endorsed many of the same policies,39 but Shaffer admirably develops them at 
a level of functional detail beyond what others have proposed. 
Smashing the Frame 
The question though is not just what reforms would be useful or wise, but 
how to make them achievable. The two-step model is not just a policy process; 
instead it is the reflection of a deeply seeded normative narrative about how 
trade should work and where it fits into the political-social economy. As I have 
described at much greater length,40  the “grow the pie” narrative plays a key, 
foundational role in the consensus over international trade policy of the past 
few decades. It operates not only at the level of the trade experts, but also 
among the broader interested public, providing a short-hand justification for the 
GATT, WTO, and the negotiation of other free trade agreements. But it goes 
further still, justifying and structuring a bifurcated politics, in which trade and 
social welfare policy are debated separately, in different fora, by different par-
ticipants, and according to different logics. The trade “grows the pie” narrative 
constructs international trade policy as fundamentally a question of economics 
 
 33.  Shaffer, supra note 23, at 3–4, 10–11. 
 34.  Id. at 17–42. 
 35.  Id. at 17–22. 
 36.  Id. at 23–26. 
 37.  Id. at 26–29, 33–38. 
 38.  Id. at 38–41. 
 39.  Cohen, supra note 21. 
 40.  Id. at 12. 
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and efficiency, separate from other policy questions, in which technocrats, 
economists, and business leaders are necessary experts. Trade liberalization is 
the assumed goal, and negotiations concern only the specific pace and form it 
will take. Other policy concerns, including redistribution, are purposely left to 
domestic politics, where all stakeholders can battle it out over value trade-offs. 
Structured that way, the fact that trade liberalization moves forward while so-
cial policy stagnates is hardly surprising. While trade is partly insulated from 
domestic politics, social welfare policy, operating in the shadow of existing 
trade commitments, is not. In essence, the two-step model that the grow-the-pie 
narrative feeds has structured a politics and policy process that reinforces the 
dominance of that narrative and model. 
Breaking free from that model requires an entirely new political discus-
sion about trade that reframes its purpose and reshuffles its stakeholders. A new 
normative narrative is needed that can reconnect the benefits of trade liberaliza-
tion with other political goals, both economic and non-economic, from ques-
tions of domestic economic distribution, financial regulation, and regulation of 
the digital economy, to issues like climate change and the social meaning of 
work in an economy built around data and artificial intelligence. In a recent pa-
per of mine, What is International Trade Law For?, I propose a new narrative, 
distilled from principles of embedded liberalism and human rights, focused on 
the state’s obligation to provide for the welfare of its people.41 Such a narrative 
would re-embed trade’s economic benefits within the broader range of domes-
tic policy concerns, tying the pace and shape of trade liberalization to other pol-
icy goals, yoking the gains from trade to policies for social and economic redis-
tribution. It would also make trade law part of an international strategy of 
cooperative capability promotion. Notably, the policy prescriptions such a nar-
rative would suggest—negotiations over increased tax coordination and coop-
eration, roles for labor and other stakeholders in regulatory enforcement, and 
opening agreements up to trades of policy flexibilities—overlap considerably 
with those presented by Shaffer. 
But we should not harbor any illusions that we can produce these changes 
through academic papers and policy proposals. While support from trade law-
yers and negotiators will certainly help smooth the path to reform and may 
generate valuable ideas, it is questionable whether it alone can produce a fun-
damental shift of paradigms. And at a time when questions about the trading 
system are joined by concerns about the growing gap between the gains to capi-
tal and labor;42 the resilience of the human rights system;43 the transformation 
 
 41. Id. at 16. 
 42.  See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014); SAMUEL MOYN, 
NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD (2018). See also MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE 
OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY (2015). 
 43.  See generally Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era, 96 TEX. L. REV. 279 
(2017). 
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of the economy through big data, artificial intelligence, and automation;44  and 
the dangers of climate change; a fundamental paradigm shift may be needed.   
Any successful new normative narrative will emerge organically from 
politics and political movements. The best that scholars like Shaffer and me can 
hope to do is start conversations and seed ideas. Shaffer, who has elsewhere 
written incisively about the importance of democratic legitimacy and the need 
for local experimentation,45 would undoubtedly agree. 
Re-centering the Frame 
But should those movements even focus on trade? Trade lawyers are 
hardly alone in the current anxiety—the adjacent field of investment law faces 
issues as well. Investor-state dispute settlement is actively being renegotiated as 
states withdraw from the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes and from bilateral investment treaties.46 The availability and terms of 
dispute settlements are being renegotiated in those states’ model treaties, their 
regional agreements,47 and through the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (“UNICTRAL”).48 Every possible reform seems on the table 
somewhere, from arbitrator selection and ethics, to procedure, to access, and to 
substantive protections like “Fair and Equitable Treatment” (“FET”).49 Human 
rights are under attack from both the right and left. Right-wing populists in Po-
land, Hungary, Brazil, and the Philippines attack the human rights system and 
rule of law and have joined autocrats in Russia, Saudi Arabia, and China in ig-
noring human rights law’s protections and prohibitions.50 On the left, human 
 
 44.  See generally RICHARD BALDWIN, THE GLOBOTICS UPHEAVAL: GLOBALIZATION, ROBOTICS, AND 
THE FUTURE OF WORK (2019). 
 45.  See generally Shaffer, supra note 23. 
 46. See Nandakumar Ponniya, Withdrawal from Investment Treaties: An Omen for Waning Investor Pro-
tection in AP?, BAKER MCKENZIE (May 12, 2017), 
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2017/05/withdrawal-from-investment-treaties; Aditi 
Shah, India’s proposed investment treaty terms leave foreign partners cold, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2018, 12:13 
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/india-investment-treaty/indias-proposed-investment-treaty-terms-leave-
foreign-partners-cold-idUSL4N1P72N1. 
 47. See Martin J. Valasek, et al., Major changes for investor-state dispute settlement in new United 
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Oct. 2018), 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/170779/major-changes-for-investor-state-dispute-
settlement-in-new-united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/. 
 48.  See generally Julian Arato, The Private Law Critique of International Investment Law, 113 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 1 (2019); Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform 
of Investment Law, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 361 (2018); Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies 
Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45 (2013). 
 49.  See Lorenzo Cotula, et al., Investor-State Arbitration: An Opportunity for Real Reform?, COLUMBIA 
CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT (Dec. 7, 2018) http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2018/12/07/investor-state-
arbitration-an-opportunity-for-real-reform/; Bart-Jaap Verbeek, ISDS reform: The need For a Substantive 
Overhaul to Investment Protection, CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (May 7, 
2018), https://www.somo.nl/isds-reform-need-substantive-overhaul-investment-protection/; Nicolette Butler & 
Surya Subedi, The Future of International Investment Regulation: Towards a World Investment Organisation?, 
64 NETH. INT. L. REV. 50 (2017). 
 50.  See Max Bergmann et al., The Rise of Far-Right Populism Threatens Global Democracy and Securi-
ty, CTR FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 2, 2018), 
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rights law has been criticized for its silence in the face of growing economic 
inequality,51 with some even arguing that it has been complicit.52 Similar cri-
tiques have been levied against the global financial system. For many, the 2008 
financial crisis demonstrated that the existing system was built, first and fore-
most, to protect the interests of capital; in the emergency response, banks were 
saved, even at the cost of public finances, underwater homeowners, or the new-
ly unemployed.53 International Criminal Law—along with the WTO, the other 
great hope of the 1990s—is teetering. South Africa, Gambia, Burundi, and the 
Philippines have all threatened to withdraw from the International Criminal 
Court,54 with the latter two following through.55 And the law of armed conflict 
could not stop Russia’s annexation of Crimea, nor the seeming free-for-all in 
Syria. As many have observed, it is the entire imagined order of the 1990’s that 
is in flux.56 
But the disorder within these regimes seems only symptomatic of the 
broader public policy anxiety rippling around the world. Little progress has 
been made in responding to climate change, even as its danger is more widely 
felt. Cyber-attacks, manipulation of social media, privacy intrusions, and iden-
tity theft, together with the massive, growing power of big data companies, 
raise serious questions about the proper regulation of the Internet. Together 
with rapid advances in artificial intelligence and automation, they also raise 
questions about the future of work. When robots take the service jobs that re-
placed manufacturing, what will people do? How will states respond? 
In the face of all these brewing questions, the challenges facing the trade 
regime look merely epiphenomenal. The world is facing epochal changes with 
rippling effects across every legal regime. The world is interconnected by trade, 




 51.  See Moyn, supra note 42, at 216. 
 52.  See generally Susan Marks, Four Human Rights Myths, in HUMAN RIGHTS: OLD PROBLEMS, NEW 
POSSIBILITIES 217 (David Kinley, Wojciech Sadurski & Kevin Walton eds., 2013). See also Umut Özsu, Ne-
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cerns. The question is how central trade and trade rules should be in responding 
to them. 
The siloing of trade into a separate legal regime over the past decades, 
abetted by the narrative of growing the pie, has allowed trade agreements to 
move forward according to the logic of comparative advantage, relatively insu-
lated from these other concerns. Other policy areas are forced to catch up and 
find some accommodation within the already agreed-upon rules. Concerns 
about access to medicine, pushed to the fore by the AIDS epidemic, had to con-
tend with the already existing strictures of the Agreement on the Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), 57 before finding some ac-
commodation in the Doha Declaration58  and an amendment to TRIPS.59 Con-
cerns about labor and human rights have similarly been playing a game of 
catch-up with the complex value chains trade agreements have fostered. Ques-
tions about how best to regulate data or how to deal with climate change are 
now finding themselves in the same position.60 
The anxieties of 2019 raise intricately complex policy questions. Should 
states be allowed to subsidize research, development, and manufacturing of 
green technologies? Which serves competing goals better: freer trade in solar 
panels or the development of domestic green industries? Should states be al-
lowed to tax financial transactions or data flows? Should data be allowed to 
travel freely across borders or localized? How should local or global competi-
tion law respond to the growing power of “big data”?61 Trade law and trade 
logic plays a role in all these questions, but whether or not it is the dominant 
concern or the right frame is an open question. 
The siloing of trade is far from pre-ordained.62 The separation of interna-
tional trade from investment, monetary policy, development, energy policy, an-
titrust, or human rights is far from obvious. In fact, many of these issues have 
recently appeared alongside trade, if albeit in free trade agreements, leading 
many to talk of a “trade and…” agenda. The planned postwar International 
Trade Organization would have also put trade in a broader policy context than 
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade did.63 Instead, trade’s current sta-
tus is a reflection of the particular politics and power structures of the past few 
decades. This is the value of the historical work published by Andrew Lang, 64 
Samuel Moyn,65 Quinn Slobodian,66 Adam Tooze,67 Mona Pinchis-Paulsen,68 
and Nicolas Lamp,69  among others: not only does the scholarship reveal the 
contingency of our current regimes of international economic law, it disinters 
the varied alternative ordering ideas that once vied for authority but have now 
been forgotten. And, it reminds us that, in answering the international and do-
mestic challenges facing us, we need not accept the legal frames we have inher-
ited, nor their respective contents. And, as Roberts, Moraes, and Ferguson have 
pointed out, that process of reframing has already begun.70 One response to the 
current uncertainty, pursued by states like the United States and China, has 
been to embrace Geoeconomics, the reframing of international economic rela-
tions as essentially questions of national security.71 A frame of cooperative 
growth is replaced by a frame of competition.  There is no reason why we need 
to cede the (re)framing to them.   
Conclusion 
Invisible, the oxygen we breathe can be easy to ignore—so too, the narra-
tives and assumptions underlying the regime of international trade. If we want 
to reform that regime, however, those narratives need to be rendered visible and 
tested. An awkward period of critical introspection seems necessary. But Shaf-
fer’s commitment to empiricism and pragmatism,72 orientation toward law and 
society,73 and immersion in interdisciplinary approaches74 make him uniquely 
well placed to lead the search for new ways forward. Retooling International 
Trade Law75 should serve as a beacon for future work questioning the existing 
paradigm and rigorously reimagining it. 
 
 
 63.  See Daniel Drache, The Short but Significant Life of the International Trade Organization: Lessons 
for Our Time, CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF GLOBALIZATION AND REGIONALISATION 25–27 (Nov. 2000), 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/47530.pdf. 
 64.  See generally ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: REIMAGINING THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2011). 
 65.  See Moyn, supra note 42. 
 66.  See Slobodian, supra note 62. 
 67. See Tooze, supra note 53. 
 68.  See Mona Pinchis-Paulsen, Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Trade and Investment Law: 
1918–1956 (2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, King’s College London) (on file with author). 
 69.  See Nicolas Lamp, Value and Exchange in Multilateral Trade Lawmaking, 4 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 
7, 13–17 (2016). 
 70.  See Roberts, et al., supra note 16. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See Shaffer, supra note 23. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  See TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday and Gregory Shaffer eds., 2014); Gregory 
Shaffer & Tom Ginsberg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012). 
 75.  Shaffer, supra note 23. 
